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Energy is at the top of the list of the state's priority issues. High
energy costs and prices are seen as critical factors influencing the
state's economic climate.
Utility rate regulation plays a major role in determining these
costs and prices. Given their importance to the state's future, it is
imperative that rate regulation be carefully analyzed to encourage
improvements in efficiency whenever possible. This concern with
reducing costs extends to both the cost of the regulatory process
itself and the utilities' production costs.
Ironically, in a period of rapidly increasing energy costs, one of
the key problems to be resolved is the financial health of utility
companies. Investor owned utilities have been facing a financial
crises. The performance of utility stocks and bonds in recent years
has been shockingly poor. Almost all utility stocks are selling be-
low book value. New equity financing thus dilutes the equity of
existing shareholders. Downgraded bond ratings make bond
financing extremely expensive.'
In 1981, the utility industry had one of the worst profit perform-
ances in over twenty years.2 In 1982, utilities were stronger per-
formers. Although the outlook for 1983 is encouraging, the
financial health of utility companies remains a major concern.3 A
financially debilitated industry cannot ensure the state a long-run
supply of electricity produced at lowest cost. Even if reduced en-
ergy demand continues, the United States will begin bumping up
against estimated available energy supply by late in this decade.
4
t Distinguished Professor of Administrative Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. Hitch, Utilities in Trouble, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 4, 1982, at 18.
2. Utility Profit Margins Improve in 1981, But Still Near 25-year Low, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Dec. 9, 1982, at 48.
3. Id. A recent investigation by the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC) concluded that electric utilities experienced serious and sub-
stantial financial difficulties in the late 1970's and up to mid-1981. NARUC concludes
that the industry is currently undergoing a modest economic recovery. The continuance
of this apparent recovery is uncertain. See Smartt, Pages with the Editor, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Sept. 30, 1982, at 6.
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Persistent rate suppression producing low rates of return will dis-
tort the investment strategy of the industry so that these needs
may not be adequately met, or met at higher cost through last
minute accomodation. Thus, paradoxically, rates would be much
higher and service less reliable if rates of return are suppressed in
the short run.
5
State utility regulators must take a leadership role in addressing
both the problem of providing energy to consumers at the lowest,
most efficient cost of production and the problem of the financial
debility of the utility industry. 6 This will be a difficult task. As a
well known forecaster has indicated, "Unable to attack powerful
oil interests, utilities have become the targets of consumer groups
who feel helpless to control the rising cost of energy.
' '7
The articles presented in this symposium make a significant con-
tribution to the principled resolution of these problems by present-
ing differing views on important utility rate regulation issues in
Minnesota. The papers may be categorized into the following
general areas: 1) the public policy function of the Minnesota Pub-
lic Utilities Commission; 2) the role of cost and non-cost factors in
ratemaking; 3) recovery of abandoned construction costs; 4) public
utility commission review of utility company capital structures;
5) proposals to expedite the regulatory process while preserving
effective public participation; and 6) judicial review of rate of re-
turn calculations.
Although it appears that a prerequisite to operation of a public
utilities commission is a clear understanding of the commission's
proper function, the public policy function has only recently be-
come a matter of discussion in public and private sectors. As one
might expect, commentators are far from a consensus on the issue.
Some argue that the role of a utilities commission is one of resolv-
ing the market failure of natural monopoly. They believe that the
commission should be concerned principally with achieving eco-
nomic efficiency in allocation of resources and production of serv-
ices. It follows that a fundamental commission objective should be
5. Navarro, Utility Bills: The Real Price of Electricity, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1983, at 22,
col. 3.
6. John Larkin, while President of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners, commented that state regulators had to raise public awareness of the utili-
ties' financial plight. Hayes, Why Not Listen to the People?, ELEC. WORLD, Dec. 1981, at 3;
see Hayes, Can Privately Owned Utilities Survive?, ELEC. WORLD, Mar. 1981, at 3.
7. Abrams,John Naisbiti Makes a Handsome Living Reading Newspapersfor Big Corpora-
tions, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1982, at 50, col. 1.
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to decregulate and rely on competition whenever possible. Others
argue that utilities commissions are charged with the responsibility
to achieve both economic efficiency and public interest conceri s,
such as social welfare. Reconciliation of these positions is a diffi-
cult, if not impossible, task.
Commissioner Juanita Satterlee presents the "human element"
in the ratemaking process. She reflects over her role as a Commis-
sioner with the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission and her
experiences with persons facing power shut-offs because they can-
not afford to pay their utility bills. Commissioner Satterlee argues
that, as a regulator, she has a responsibility to ensure the utility an
adequate return on equity, but also a responsibility to address the
social concerns presented by low income utility customers.
Professor Neil Hamilton and Irving Colacci argue that eco-
nomic efficiency should be the primary objective of the Minnesota
commission. Hamilton and Colacci see utility regulation as an
attempt to deal with the market failure created by conditions of
decreasing average costs in natural monopolies. They conclude
that the only appropriate regulatory response is to confine utility
regulation to maintaining efficiency in allocation of resources and
production of services, fairness in pricing across classes of custom-
ers, and accountability to affected parties. Hamilton and Colacci
conclude that, within these objectives, marginal cost pricing is the
proper rule of thumb and efforts to overcome obstacles to its use
should continue.
An issue closely related to the discussion of the proper function
of the utility commission is the role of cost and non-cost factors in
the ratemaking process. Eldon J. Spencer, Jr. discusses the role of
cost-of-service studies and the factors to be considered in distribut-
ing revenues among customer classes. He notes that, under Min-
nesota law, rates must be reasonable. Factors used in determining
reasonable rates include accounting (embedded) costs, economic
(marginal) costs, economic externalities, and non-cost factors, such
as, value of service, ability to pay, tax consequences, and ability to
pass on increases. In his analysis of cost of service studies, Spencer
concludes that, given the speculative nature of such studies, the \
commission places too much emphasis on them. He recommends
that the commission encourage all parties to submit cost of service
studies in order to avoid sole reliance on utility gathered
information.
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losses is dealt with in two papers. Rodney A. Wilson discusses the
regulatory treatment of such losses by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission and state commissions. Specifically, he examines
cases that have allowed amortization of losses, and cases that have
not, in order to determine what principles govern the authoriza-
tion of amortization. In addition, after reviewing a recent Ohio
Supreme Court decision, Wilson suggests that there is an unconsti-
tutional taking of property when the utility is denied the right to
recover its investment loss and the decision to proceed and later to
cancel was reasonable and prudent. Wilson concludes by sug-
gesting a number of regulatory and administrative changes aimed
at mitigating the uncertainties inherent in both load forecasts and
long plant construction lead times. These reforms may also reduce
the occurrence of plant cancellations.
Gene R. Sommers analyzes the prudent investment test for
abandoned construction adopted by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission and the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.
While approving of the prudent investment test generally, he criti-
cizes the approach of both commissions in denying any return on
the unamortized balance of the losses from abandoned projects.
Even if the abandoned plant is not used and useful, it is the capital
that has been dedicated to the public use and, therefore, that capi-
tal is entitled to a fair rate of return.
Two papers and two responses deal with commission review of
utility company capital structures. James W. Brehl and James A.
Gallagher begin their paper by noting the importance of the capi-
tal structure determination to the overall rate of return determina-
tion and the ramifications of severe changes or adjustments in the
capital structure on the viability of the utility. After extensively
examining telephone, gas, and electric rate proceedings over the
past decade, Brehl and Gallagher note that, with only a few excep-
tions, the Minnesota commission has refused to impose capital
structures upon utilities, thus leaving determination of the struc-
ture in the hands of utility management. The authors conclude
that the Minnesota commission should continue to oppose at-
tempts by intervenors to impose capital structures on the utilities.
Bruce M. Louiselle and Jean E. Heilman examine the capital
structure issue and conclude that it is a crucial element in the es-
tablishment of just and reasonable rates. Louiselle and Heilman
argue that state statutes, case precedent, and principles of utility
regulation compel the commission to refrain from deferring to util-
ity management decisions in determining the appropriate capital
[Vol. 8
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/1
FOREWORD
structure upon which to set rates. In fulfilling its obligation to bal-
ance the interests of both the utility company and customers, and
to assess the broad public interest, the commission must impose the
appropriate burden of proof on the utility and reject the actual
capital structure in favor of a hypothetical capital structure when
the utility fails to sustain its burden of proof.
The capital structure debate is addressed further in a Response
by Brehl and Gallagher and a Rejoinder by Louiselle and Heil-
man. These additional articles focus on specific arguments made
in the preceding papers in an effort to refute, clarify, and elaborate
on the positions advocated.
A commonly discussed problem in the regulatory field is that of
"regulatory lag." Regulatory lag refers to the period in which the
regulatory process takes place. It is most often used in a negative
sense, since long lags may place significant burdens on the regu-
lated utility. Richard De Long analyzes proposals to expedite the
regulatory process while attempting to preserve effective public
participation. De Long deals specifically with the due process re-
quirements of interim rates and cost adjustment clauses, two com-
mon proposals submitted to deal with regulatory lag.
Under the interim rate scheme, new rates are set pending final
determination of permanent rates. The cost adjustment clause al-
lows the utility to adjust its rates to correspond with fluctuations in
certain specified operating costs. After reviewing the development
of interim rates and cost adjustment clauses in Minnesota and
other states, De Long concludes that, in Minnesota, there are sub-
stantially less due process protections for utility customers in the
interim rate provisions when compared with cost adjustment pro-
visions. He suggests that an expansion of the types of costs passed
through in cost adjustment clauses would reduce the need for ap-
plication of interim rates, thus mitigating the effects of regulatory
lag and strengthening due process protection of utility customers.
Finally, the symposium addresses the role of the judiciary in the
review of rate of return determinations by utilities commissions.
Samuel L. Hanson and R. Scott Davies define and discuss three
rate of return approaches: comparable earnings, risk premium,
and discounted cash flow. After reviewing Minnesota statutory
and case law, the authors conclude that Minnesota follows the
"substantial evidence" rule regarding the scope of judicial review
of evidence supporting the factual findings on these rate of return
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view of jury verdicts. Hanson and Davies then discuss how consti-
tutional law has dealt with the issue of confiscatory rates with
regard to rate of return calculations. Concluding that the law is
out of date, the authors suggest factors that should be included in
any analysis of whether rates are on the one hand fair and reason-
able, or, on the other hand, confiscatory.
Professor Neil Hamilton and Irving Colacci agree with Hanson
and Davies that labeling the process of determining both rate of
return and rate structure a quasi-legislative decision and imposing
a very deferential scope of review is inappropriate. The scope of
review should depend on careful analysis of the type of issue
presented. For the same reason, Hamilton and Colacci disagree
with the position of Hansen and Davies that it is appropriate first
to label the entire rate of return determination as a quasi-judicial
exercise subject to a more stringent scope of review, and second, to
label the entire rate structure determination a quasi-legislative ex-
ercise, subject to a less stringent scope of review. This labeling ap-
proach ignores the different types of issues within the rate of return
determination. Basic facts should be distinguished and subjected
to a different scope of review than facts involving the frontiers of
scientific knowledge or legislative policy determinations. All three
are evident in rate of return decisions. Hamilton and Colacci sug-
gest an appropriate scope of review to address these distinctions.
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